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Abstract 
In settings where hard-copy materials which are not allowed to be reproduced by any means but are massively delivered to users 
security specialists distinguish a real threat which is duplication. Such materials may be banknotes, legal documents like 
diplomas, CDs or even electronic materials distributed over the internet.  One of the ways to fight duplication, software piracy 
and not only, is the usage of digital signatures. For this reason algorithms and advanced techniques of digital signatures are used 
nowadays which proved or at least pretended to be secure. Their security is fragile if the secrecy of the key is compromised. Even 
though the compromise happened unpremeditatedly or as a result of an attack, this causes the production of digital signatures 
even by ‘differently interested’ people.  In our paper we are going to introduce a digital signature scheme which is based on 
Rabin scheme. According to this idea we have built an ID generation scheme which can be used in many situations where is 
needed such a level of security. We will apply this technique in software copy protection. 
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1. Introduction 
Data confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation are basic concerns of securing data delivery over an 
insecure network, such as the Internet. Confidentiality means that only authorized receivers will get the data; 
authenticity, an authorized receiver can verify the identity of the data’s source; integrity, an authorized receiver can 
verify that received data have not been modified; non-repudiation, an authorized receiver can prove to a third party 
the identity of the data’s source. 
In settings where hard-copy materials which require to be unique and not allowed to be reproduced by any means 
such as banknotes, legal documents like diplomas, CDs or even electronic materials distributed over the internet are 
massively delivered to users, document security specialists distinguish a real threat which is duplication. It consists 
in copying information from a genuine document into a new physical support (the copy) [4].  
On Software Piracy Markets[9] software piracy caused losses of $58.8 Billion in 2010, an increase of 14 percent 
from the previous year, according to the Business Software Alliance (BSA) [10]. In this study it is shown that:  
“The global piracy rate dropped by 1 point from 2009 to 42 percent — which remains the second-highest 
global rate in the study's history. Half of the 116 economies studied in 2010 had piracy rates of 62 percent 
or higher, and two-thirds had at least one software program pirated for every one installed legally. 
Emerging economies now account for more than half the global value of PC software theft, $31.9 billion. 
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Public opinion strongly favors intellectual property (IP) rights: seven PC users in 10 support paying 
innovators for their creations to promote more technology advances. ...”. 
 
In the chart below are listed the main regions and the respective software piracy rates.  
 
Fig. 1. PC software piracy rates by region [10] 
 
One of the ways against software piracy and not only is the usage of digital signatures. A digital signature or 
digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or 
document [5]. Digital signatures are equivalent to traditional handwritten signatures in many respects; properly 
implemented digital signatures are more difficult to forge than the handwritten type.   
In our paper we are going to introduce a digital signature scheme which is based on Rabin scheme [8]. It offers 
forward security and it has been implemented in order to serve to an agency for signing legal documents such as 
high school diplomas. One of the main problems of using this scheme in these legal documents was the length of the 
code, that’s why we believe that the same scheme is more appropriate in software copy protection.  
2. Digital signatures security 
Algorithms and advanced techniques of digital signatures used nowadays are proved or at least pretended to be 
secure. Their security is fragile if the secrecy of the key is compromised. Even though the compromise happened 
unpremeditatedly or as a result of an attack, this causes the production of digital signatures even by ‘differently 
interested’ people.  
In ‘the best case’, when the secrecy and existence of false signatures is noticed, all the signatures produced by that 
key are considered false. In this moment all the signatures with the compromised key become suspected, and this is 
valid for all times: at the moment of the secret sharing, before and after this moment. In order to surpass these 
situations different methods are proposed, depending on the signature holder requests and mostly on the possible 
behaviours of the falsifier, during the attack and after it.  
A classical method used for the secret preservation is the secret sharing techniques [1]. These techniques have 
resulted widely successful in secret preservation but their usage is oriented mostly towards relatively large 
enterprises. They wouldn’t be the right solution for the end-user. On the other hand, as proposed by [3], information 
distribution always adds a negative factor to data security – for example an infiltration hole in the system of one of 
the information holders.  
2.1. Forward security 
A more economic and realistic approach would be to admit the (real) threat of key compromise Instead of trying to 
eliminate that threat we could try to minimize the damage it would bring if succeeded. This approach is called 
forward-security, firstly introduced in 1997 by R. Anderson [6], adopted from an analogue concept: forward-
secrecy. Later, by the year 2000, Bellare and Minir [3] formalized his idea by introducing even some applicative 
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schemes. With forward-security Anderson et al. intend those situations when signature key compromise does not 
nullify the signatures prior to it. Of course, this is not always the case. If a secret key is compromised by an intruder, 
he can create signatures which date even prior the moment of compromise. By doing so, all the signatures created 
with that key and before this moment are considered not valuable. This is the biggest and an irreparable damage that 
can be done to the signature scheme. The only solution is to nullify all false signatures by changing the signature 
key. But this process would nullify even the ‘fair’ signatures.  
For this reason at the beginning research was focused in those schemes that offered the so-called forward-security. 
We can mention not only the forward-secure signatures of Bellare and Miner [3] but also  the key-evolving signature 
schemes of Abdalla and Reyzin [2]. They are based on the segmentation of time in equal slices, in which signature 
keys remain unchanged. These keys change from one time slice to the other, while the public key used for 
verification remains unchanged. Keys change progressively, following a one-pad function. This function calculates 
the key depending only on the predecessor key (the very first key is calculated depending on an initial secret, which 
is deleted after usage and so does, every other key after it is used). A deleted key cannot be used for signing since it 
is considered expired. So, a falsifier who discovers the secret key in a moment of time, won’t be able to find the 
keys used in prior intervals, and also not even sign (false) documents with those keys.  
2.2. Monotone signature schemes 
An opposite approach to the problem mentioned above is the one introduced by Naccache, Pointchecal and Tymen 
[4] in the 5th Conference on Financial Cryptography. According to this approach, in the case when the falsifier 
knows the secret key, this key can be changed to nullify all the falsified documents. The idea is analogue to that 
used by national banks which use steganographic signs in the released banknotes. If the bank gets informed that the 
adversary fabrics some of these signs, other signs come out and checks only these new signs (which were always 
there but were uncovered yet).  
According to [4] the monotone signature can be formalized and considered as a triple (G, S, V), where:  
 G is a key-obtainer algorithm. For two security parameters k and n it gains a series {(si, vi)}i=1..n of couples 
of secret keys – corresponding public keys.  
 S is a signature algorithm. For a message m, by using secret keys s1, s2... sn, it calculates the signature:  
V = S (s1, s2... sn, m).  
 V is a set of monotone verifying algorithms (V1, V2..., Vn) whose values are: Vi(v1,v2,...,vn, m, V)  {V,G} 
and such that it might be impossible for an intruder to sign from Vj+1 without knowing the secret sj+1.  
3.  Application of the signature  
According to this idea we have built an ID generation scheme. This scheme was first asked by the Agency for 
Achievement Evaluation in the Education Directorate of Tirana, Albania. They needed a security scheme in their 
certificates of high school students. This system must identify diplomas and must be resistant toward falsifications. 
It also should offer a decentralized verification system. The system we are going to introduce presumes that 
verification of diplomas can be done by local educational directorates. It also can be used in many other situations 
where is needed such a level of security. One of the most common is to use them in massive production CDs. The 
codes are stamped on the CD covers of these massive productions, such as software, audio or video CD, video-
games, etc. They also can be inserted as part of any verification process of electronic content downloaded online, 
such as online shopping, e-books, and other electronic content.  
Our idea is that after the generation of n-couples of keys {(si, vi)}i=1..n, the scheme keeps hidden the half  {(si)}i=1..n 
(compounded by the first coordinates) of it and makes public the other part of it {(vi)}i=1..n, for any j<n (compounded 
by the second coordinates). The message m is V = S(s1, s2, ..., sn, m), and can be done only by the scheme generator, 
while all verifiers check if, for that given  j, Vj(v1,v2,...,vj, m, V) = V. 
If the scheme generator is obliged or forced to give any information regarding the scheme, he can show to the 
falsifiers who own the signature algorithm and also the secret keys {si}i=1..j, needed to build a real subscription. With 
all these a falsifier would build “real” signatures which would not be perceived as such at level j of control. At this 
moment, if the signature holder is released the central directorate sends to all local directorates the level j+1 of 
security, with which they must check all signatures generated till that moment. False signatures did not consider 
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(since they did not know) the keys sj+1, ..., sn, and as a result Vj+1(v1,v2,...,vj+1, m, V) ≠ V. This way, it is easy to see 
that the document is false.  
3.1.  Structure of the algorithm 
THE ALGORITHM: In order to demonstrate our idea we have adopted the following application of identifying 
numbers. Formally we are dealing with a signature of Rabin of a pseudo-random number. According to the 
suggestion of [4], we added to the signature V  some “hidden coincidence” taken as follows:  
Let’s take a set Nn={1,2, ... , n} and choose two subsets E and E’ such that E ∩ E'=׎. The set E’ is public and also 
the set F  E. For each of the elements of the first set we build a random function fi, which is kept secret together 
with the set E and the private key of the signature (which in the Rabin signature is the expansion of the n Bloom’s 
module in prime factors). For each of the indexes i in Nn which are not in E, we choose a pseudo-random number ri 
(in our algorithm it is chosen by Mersenne Twister, but it can be reached a higher security if it is used the Blum 
Blum Shub generator). For the remaining indexes i, the ri-numbers are not random, nor pseudo-random but are 
values from the functions fi in the set E’.  
If we are going to sign a message, we append it to the array r. In our model we sign only the number r, after we 
check if it is part of QR(n). To include even the cases when that number is not a quadratic remainder mod n, we add 
four digits to it. In this form it can be signed; the hidden factors p and q of module n are chosen ≡ 3. In this manner 
it is easier to find the square roots of these modules and then we can find the square root according to the module n, 
by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.  
3.2. Algorithm verification 
VERIFICATION: It is a very simple procedure to verify if a given number is the square root of another number. 
This can be done by every local directorate. Also to check the authenticity of a signature then if there is any 
information leak over these functions, the set F is expanded to G (F G E) and it is checked if:   
The ri numbers we have considered are single digit decimal numbers and not binary numbers. In this way we reduce 
5 times the possibility for a successful falsification in comparison to the binary case. According to [4], if the 
possibility of a successful falsification is 2-c (where c is the expansion factor of the set F), considering the ri digits as 
decimal, would lower this possibility to 10-c.  
4. Conclusions, recommendations and  future work 
We chose Rabin signature because it is easier in verification but the scheme becomes more secure if we use a more 
advanced signature and which is not very long. One can be the signature scheme of Okamoto-Schnorr [7] used in 
[4].  
In this paper we introduced how to use Rabin signature and improve it order to increase the security level. We also 
show here the implemented algorithm for verifying if a given signature is false or not (see Appendix A).  
We suggest implementing this scheme in software distributed via CD or over the internet during the installation 
phase. The user will be asked to enter the code stamped over the CD cover, this code will be verified and then the 
user can be allowed or not to continue with the installation. One of the advantages of this scheme is that it is 
resistant by a high degree to key generation software. Even though they may detect the code, they will do so only 
temporarily since the scheme changes the codes over time.  
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Appendix A – Digital Signature Verification 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
